Thursday, March 10, 2011
How To Defeat Faction
Tuesday, March 8, 2011
Free Dmv Ny Bill Of Sale For Car
How Many Calories In Bean With Ham Soup
entire town is invited to attend.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
Friday, March 4, 2011
Motion Sensor Paper Towel Dispenser How Work
Saturday, February 26, 2011
Avocado Tree Dying, What To Do
Monday, February 21, 2011
What Liquids Can You Put In A Camelbak
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Healing Time After Freezing Genital Wart
Il prossimo viaggio letterario e culinario attraverso le favole del mondo ci condurrà in Sud America con la Favola “ Il sale e lo zucchero ” ( Perù ).
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Vowrenewal Cake Design
Sunday March 20 GAAS 2011 the organize the XIII Day Street of 'Operation Scurpiddu .
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Cheerokee Filmography
Animating Ideas of Idealism:
A Semantic Sonata in Kant and Hegel
Lecture One
Norms, Selves, and Concepts
1. In these lectures I consider some of the ideas that animated the philosophical tradition, anchored and epitomized by Kant and Hegel, which they called ‘idealism.’ My aim is to reanimate some of those ideas, breathing new life into them by exhibiting a new perspective from which they show up as worthy of our interest and attention today. I do that by retrospectively rationally reconstructing a coherent, cumulative trajectory of thought, carving it out of the context in which it is embedded, ruthlessly ignoring elements near and dear to Kant and Hegel that are not essential to the line of thought on which I am focusing. This will seem to some a perverse sort of enterprise. At the end of my third and final lecture I assemble conceptual raw materials drawn from all three lectures, in order to address the methodological issue of how to think about the nature, justification, and possible value of this sort of undertaking.
2. At the heart of Descartes’ innovations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind lies a revolutionary semantic idea. He saw that the rising new science required giving up the old ways of thinking about the relations between appearance and reality. Since the Greeks, the idea had been that, at least when things go well, the way things appear to us resembles the way they really are. Resemblance in this sense is a matter of sharing properties (or some more general sort of form), as a realistic picture shares some elements of shape and perhaps color with what it pictures. But on Copernicus’s account, the reality behind the appearance of a stationary Earth and a revolving Sun is a rotating Earth and stationary Sun. No resemblance there. And Galileo’s reading of what he calls the “book of nature, written in the language of mathematics” finds the best way of getting a grip on the reality of motion to be by manipulating geometrical appearances, in which a period of time shows up as the length of a line, and acceleration as the area of triangle. The category of resemblance is of little help in understanding the connections that are being exploited. And in Descartes’ own algebraized geometry, the equations of lines and circles do not at all resemble the geometrical figures about which they let us reason so effectively. Descartes sees that a more abstract notion of representation is needed. We’ve been worrying about it ever since.
[….]
3. Where Descartes’ semantic concerns center on the nature of representational success, Kant addresses more fundamental questions about the nature of representational purport. What is it, he wants to know, for our ideas so much as to seem to be about something? What is it for us to take or treat them as, for them to show up to us as, representings, in the sense of something that answers for its correctness to what thereby counts as being represented? This issue is the core around which cluster the other elements of Kant’s concern with what he calls “objectivity.” The line of thought he develops to answer these questions begins with the identification of a critical shortcoming of the account of judgment he inherited. That account finds its place as part of the traditional classificatory theory of consciousness. This is the idea that to be aware of something is to take it as something: paradigmatically, to classify something particular as being of some general kind. In its form as a theory of judgment, it becomes the view that judging is predicating one concept of another: putting two concepts into a relation, marked by a copula, whose paradigm once again is bringing a particular concept under a general one, or subordinating a less general to a more general one.
In a radical break with the whole of the logical tradition he inherited, Kant rejects this way of thinking about judgment. The reason he gives is that it does not apply to logically compound judgments:
I have never been able to accept the interpretation which logicians give of judgment in general. It is, they declare, the representation of a relation between two concepts…(W)hat is defective in this interpretation…(is) that it applies only to categorical, not to hypothetical and disjunctive judgments (the two latter containing a relation not of concepts but of judgments), an oversight from which many troublesome consequences have followed. [CPR B140-1]
It will be instructive to fill in some of those “troublesome consequences.” The same logical tradition distinguishes between mental acts and their contents—that is, between the two sides of what Sellars calls the “notorious ‘ing’/‘ed’ ambiguity,” which affects concepts such as judgment, representation, experience, and perception—between what one is doing in judging, representing, experiencing, or perceiving, on the one hand, and what is judged, represented, experienced, or perceived, on the other.
4. For this reason, Kant could not take over the traditional classificatory theory of consciousness, which depends on understanding judging as predicating. But what can go in its place? Here is perhaps Kant’s deepest and most original idea, the axis around which I see all of his thought as revolving. What distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of non-sapient creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they are things knowers and agents are in a distinctive way responsible for. Judging and acting involve commitments. They are endorsements, exercises of authority. Responsibility, commitment, endorsement, authority—these are all normative notions. Judgments and actions make knowers and agents liable to characteristic kinds of normative assessment. Kant’s most basic idea is that minded creatures are to be distinguished from un-minded ones not by a matter-of-fact ontological distinction (the presence of mind-stuff), but by a normative deontological one. This is his normative characterization of the mental.
Drawing on a jurisprudential tradition that includes Grotius, Pufendorf, and Crusius, Kant talks about norms in the form of rules. Judging and acting—endorsing claims and maxims, committing ourselves as to what is or shall be true—is binding ourselves by norms. It is making ourselves subject to assessment according to rules that articulate the contents of those commitments. Those norms, those rules, he calls ‘concepts’. In a strict sense, all a Kantian subject can do is apply concepts, either theoretically, in judging, or practically, in acting. Discursive, that is to say, concept-mongering creatures, are normative creatures—creatures who live, and move, and have their being in a normative space.
It follows that the most urgent philosophical task is to understand the nature of this normativity, the bindingness or validity (Verbindlichkeit, Gültigkeit) of conceptual norms. For Descartes, the question was how to think about our grip on our concepts, thoughts, or ideas (Is it clear? Is it distinct?). For Kant the question is rather how to understand their grip on us: the conditions of the intelligibility of our being bound by conceptual norms.
END
Sunday, January 23, 2011
Hollow Eyes Makeup Tips
Qui di seguito il video dell'appuntamento di Merende a teatro di Sabato 22 Gennaio, visibile sul sito del Cerchio di Gesso
Sunday, January 9, 2011
Stomach Virus Bad Farts
Below is the trailer of the documentary " Memory lost, memory regained " produced by Sergio Grillo - Fog Video Production
Saturday, December 18, 2010
Does Having A Remote Starter Cause Problems
GAAS from Ce.Se.Vo.Ca. on Vimeo .
Anna Cecilia
Patch Of Small Bumps On Stomach
Friday, December 17, 2010
Glisten Dishwasher Cleaner Dealers
Da una nota di Umberto Eco su Aristotele (e il suo commentatore Aubenque): “In Poetica 1476b 7 (nota Aubenque) si dice: “Cosa avrebbe da fare il discorso se le cose apparissero già da sole e non avessero bisogno del discorso?. Aubenque (1962: 116) cita una pagina degli Elenchi . Poiché non si possono portare nella discussione le cose stesse,ma dobbiamo servirci dei loro nomi come di simboli, noi supponiamo che ciò che avviene nei nomi avvenga anche nelle cose, come del caso dei sassolini che si usano per contare. Ma tra nomi e cose non vi è completa rassomiglianza, i nomi sono in numero limitato, e così la pluralità delle definizioni, mentre le cose sono infinite in numero (e infiniti sono i loro accidenti)” ( Kant e L'ornitorinco , n. 10 p. 390)
1) Bordeaux , Granata , Rosso Geranio , Rosso Cadmio , Rosso Tiziano , Borgogna , Carminio , Sangria , Ruggine , Mattone , Rosso cardinale , Rosso Veneziano , Rosso di Persia , Terra cotta , Castagno , Ciliegia , Corallo , Melograno , Rosso Scarlatto , Vermiglione etc…. Posso percepire tutte le sfumature del rosso se non padroneggio questi concetti? (Per una considerazione del rapporto tra linguaggio e cose, dal punto di vista del dibattito tra filosofi della scienza, vedi il vecchio post )
2) Che relationship between the vocabulary that I learn to use during the course of painting, and my ability to observe certain shades of color in the things around me? And - to be fashionable - among the words that I learn (very hard) to use during the course of the sommelier and acquiring complementary capabilities (with similar efforts) to discern the nuances of flavor for my taste experience?
3) What role does my education (the development of perceptual skills and extension of my vocabulary) into the processes by which they perceive events (not just perception, the question also applies to the political and historical, but it is more convenient from base case)?
Towards a theory of gradient . (De Lillo Vs Calvin, Episode II. Select dialogue)
"January 11, 1955
Sometimes I think the education here is better suited to dispense a fifty that he understood that he missed the target on the first lap. Too many ideas abstract. eternal verities left and right. You need to look more and appoint a shoe parties. To you in particular, Shay, saw where you came from.
This seemed to revive him. He leaned over the desk and stared at him, literally, my wet boots.
- objects are horrible, right?
- Yes, no doubt.
- Nominami parties. Courage. Here we are not so ricercati, non siamo così intellettualmente chic da non poter esaminare uno studente faccia a faccia.
– Nominare le parti, – dissi. – D’accordo. Stringhe.
– Stringhe. Una su ogni scarpa. Procedi.
Alzai un piede e lo girai goffamente.
– Suola e tacco.
– Sì, continua.
Posai di nuovo il piede a terra e fissai lo stivale, che mi parve inespressivo quanto uno scatolone chiuso.
– Procedi, ragazzo.
– Non c’è molto da nominare, le pare? Un davanti e un dietro.
– Un davanti e un dietro. Mi fai venire voglia di piangere.
– La parte arrotondata sul davanti.
– Sei talmente eloquente che I have to take a break to recover. You mentioned strings. What do you call the flap under the strings?
- Tongue.
- Be '?
- The name I knew, only that I had not seen.
Father Paulus did his little number, throwing a dead body on the desk and wincing slightly as if in the grip of a terrible anxiety.
- You did not see because you can not watch. And do not you watch because you do not know their names.
shaking his head as if to reproach me bitterly, with a theatrical gesture, and drew back from the desk, dropping his swivel chair and look again before making a quarter turn and decided to lift the right leg quel tanto che bastava perché il piede, o meglio la scarpa, trovasse una sistemazione sul bordo della scrivania, punta all’insù. Una normalissima scarpa da prete nera.
– D’accordo, – disse. – Suola e tacco li conosciamo.
– Sì.
– E abbiamo identificato la linguetta e le stringhe.
– Sì, – dissi.
Delineò con il dito una striscia di pelle che attraversava il bordo superiore della scarpa e scendeva sotto la stringa.
– Cos’è? – chiesi io.
– Dimmelo tu. Cos’è?
– Non lo so.
– È il risvolto.
– Il risvolto.
– Il risvolto. And this rigid section over the heel. This is the reinforcement.
- This piece in between the flap and the strip above the sole. This is the back.
- The back - repeated.
- And the strip above the sole. What is the voyeur.
Say that again, boy. - The Peeping Tom.
- You see, as things are hidden in every day? Why we do not know their names. And the frontal area that covers the neck of the shoe's name?
- I do not know.
- I do not know. It is called the upper.
- Upper.
- Repeat.
- Upper. The front of the shoe that covers the neck. I thought of not having to learn things by heart.
- These are the ideas that you do not have to memorize. And do not take ourselves too seriously when their noses in front to learning by rote. The repetition helps to build a memory man. And the string you pass through what?
- This I know.
- Sure you do. The holes on both sides and above the tab.
- I can not think of the word. Eye.
- Maybe I'll let you live after all.
- The eyelets.
- Yes, and the metallic coating on each end of the string?
tapped the object in question with the middle finger.
- That I do not know neanche tra un milione di anni.
– L’aghetto.
– Neanche tra un milione di anni.
– Il puntale o aghetto.
– L’aghetto, – ripetei.
– E il piccolo anello di metallo che rinforza il bordo dell’occhiello attraverso cui passa l’aghetto. Stiamo facendo la fisica del linguaggio, Shay.
– L’anellino.
– Lo vedi?
– Sì.
– Questa è la guarnizione, – disse.
– Oddio, ragazzi.
– La guarnizione. Imparala, conoscila e amala.
– Sto andando fuori di testa.
– Questa è la conoscenza arcana definitiva. E quando porto la scarpa dal calzolaio e lui la mette su una forma per fare le riparazioni, un blocco di legno a forma di piede. Come si chiama?
– Non lo so.
– Si chiama semplicemente forma da scarpa.
– Mi si sta spaccando la testa.
– Le cose di ogni giorno rappresentano la conoscenza più trascurata. Questi nomi sono vitali per il tuo progresso. Cose quotidiane. Se non fossero importanti, non useremmo una parola così splendida di derivazione latina. Ripetila, – mi intimò.
– Quotidiano.
(…)
Mi oltrepassò con lo sguardo, facendo un ragionevole cenno d’assenso, e io mi girai per andarmene. Per un po’ camminai avanti e indietro attraversando la piazza nella tempesta di neve. Poi tornai nella mia stanza e mi liberai del giubbotto. Volevo cercare le parole sul dizionario. Mi tolsi gli stivali e lanciai il berretto sul lavandino. Volevo cercare le parole. Volevo cercare velleità e quotidiano e impararle a memoria, queste stronze di parole, una volta per sempre, impararne l’ortografia, la pronuncia, ripeterle ad alta voce, sillaba per sillaba – vocalizzare, produrre suoni vocali, emettere suoni, pronunciare le parole per quello che valevano. Questo è l’unico modo al mondo di sfuggire alle cose che hanno fatto di te quello che sei.
Underworld, Frammenti degli anni ’50 e ’60, pp. 576 – 580 .
La terza lezione americana di Calvino è dedicata al valore dell' Esattezza , di cui all’inizio lo scrittore definisce 3 significati. Il terzo significato (della terza lezione) è l'accezione che mi interessa “un linguaggio il più preciso possibile come lessico e come resa delle sfumature del pensiero e dell’immaginazione”. A tal proposito Calvino riprende un dialogo dalle Città invisibili in cui Kublai Kahn gioca a scacchi with Marco Polo and compare his achievements to the moves of a winning game.
"The final conclusion which led him this - Calvino writes - is that the object of his achievements is nothing but the piece of wood on which each piece sits a symbol of anything ...
But at that moment is a twist: Marco Polo calls the Great Khan to better observe what seems to be nothing
'Now Kublai Khan no longer had to send Marco Polo on distant expeditions: kept him playing endless games of chess. The knowledge of the empire was hidden in the design traced by the sharp jump of the horse, the gates that open to the diagonal alpha raids, and guarded by the shuffling of the king and the humble pawn, by the inexorable alternative for each game. The Great Khan tried to identify myself in the game, but now it was because of the game to escape. The end of each match is a win or a loss, but of what? What was the real issue? At checkmate, beneath the foot of the king blown away by the hand of the winner, it remains nothing: a square black or white. A force to separate his conquests to reduce them to the essence, Kublai had arrived at the extreme operation: the definitive conquest, of which the empire's multiform treasures were only illusory envelopes, was reduced to a piece of wood veneer.
Then Marco Polo spoke: - Your chessboard, sire, is inlaid with two woods: ebony and maple. The piece is fixed on which your enlightened gaze was cut into a layer of the trunk that grew in a drought year
: see how the fibers are arranged? Here you can see a node just mentioned: a bud tried to negotiate a spring day early, but the frost of the night forced him to desist -. The Great Khan had not realized until then that the stranger knew speak fluently in his language, but this was not a surprise. - Here's a bigger pore: perhaps it was the nest of a larva, not of a worm, because as soon as born
would continue to dig, but on a caterpillar chewing the leaves and was the cause for the tree was chosen to be killed ... This margin was incised with a chisel because dall'ebanista
's accession to the square near which is thicker than ...
The amount of things you could read in a piece of smooth wood and empty overwhelmed Kublai; Polo had already come to speak of the woods of ebony, rafts of logs to descend the rivers, harbors
, women at the windows. .. ' "